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Abstract 
This article tracks the shifting place of the international right to health, and human rights-
based approaches to health, in the scholarly literature and United Nations. From 1993–
1994, the focus began to move from the right to health towards human rights-based 
approaches to health, including human rights guidance adopted by UN agencies in 
relation to specific health issues. There is a compelling case for a human rights-based 
approach to health, but it runs the risk of playing down the right to health, as evidenced by 
an examination of some UN human rights guidance. The right to health has important and 
distinctive qualities that are not provided by other rights, consequently playing down the 
right to health can diminish human rights-based approaches to health, as well as the right 
to health itself. Because General Comments, the reports of UN Special Rapporteurs and 
UN agencies’ guidance are exercises in interpretation, the author discusses methods of 
legal interpretation. He suggests the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights permits distinctive interpretative methods within the boundaries 
established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. He calls for the right to 
health to be placed explicitly at the center of a human rights-based approach and 
interpreted in accordance with public international, and international human rights, law. 
 
Among the dynamics that have shaped the recent development of the international right to 
health are a drive towards its ‘real-life’ implementation for the benefit of individuals, 
communities and populations, and a movement from short, general, abstract, legal treaty 
provisions towards specific, practical human rights guidance.1 These two trends are closely 
inter-related. 
 
For example, the General Comments of United Nations human rights-treaty bodies have 
added flesh to the bare bones of human rights treaty provisions.2 Since 2002, UN Special 
Rapporteurs on the right to health have endeavored to apply the treaties, and General 
Comments, to many themes, states and other duty-bearers. When Rapporteurs encountered 
specific issues on which the existing jurisprudence gave no or scant guidance, they have 
offered their interpretations of the international right to health. UN agencies have adopted 
increasingly detailed guidance on how to operationalize human rights, for example, in 
relation to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, maternal mortality, under-5 mortality, contraceptive 
information and services, and clinical management of female genital mutilation.3 This has 
required agencies to interpret and apply treaties, General Comments and other jurisprudence, 
sometimes weighing the available evidence as part of their interpretative process. None of 
these initiatives is above criticism but, at least, as Harrington and Stuttaford put it, a 
“beginning has been made” to provide treaty provisions with detailed normative and 
operational content.4 
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Although very welcome, these important developments give rise to numerous complex 
issues. Yamin and Cantor identify some of the formidable challenges, dilemmas and 
contradictions generated by attempts to operationalize human-rights based approaches to 
health. For example, human rights are understood “as universal, deontological principles” 
yet, in operationalizing them through human rights-based approaches, “trade-offs and deeply 
contextualized political realities necessarily enter the equation.”5 
 
This article aims to supplement Yamin’s and Cantor’s analysis by addressing two questions 
that bear closely upon contemporary discussions about health and human rights. First, what is 
the role of the right to health in human rights-based approaches to health? Second, since 
General Comments, Rapporteurs’ reports and agencies’ guidance are exercises in legal 
interpretation, what is the legal methodology for the interpretation of the international right to 
health? 
 
Although there is not yet a universally agreed definition of a human rights-based approach to 
health, a good starting point is the account provided by WHO and OHCHR.6 This definition 
and others is considered by Bustreo, Hunt, Gruskin and others in Women’s and Children’s 
Health: Evidence of Impact of Human Rights.7 However, for the purposes of the present 
discussion, it is not necessary to favor one definition of a human rights-based approach to 
health. For present purposes the important point is that all these definitions encompass all 
relevant human rights including the rights to life, information, privacy, participation, 
association, equality, non-discrimination and the prohibition of torture, inhuman and 
degrading treatment. One of the key aims of this article is to explore the place of the 
international right to health in this portmanteau human rights-based approach to health. 
 
However, it is important to emphasize that there is merit in applying a human rights-based 
approach to health rather than confining the analytical and operational ‘lens’ only to the right 
to health. Although the right to health is extensive, it is narrower than a human rights-based 
approach and the wider ‘lens’ may help to devise a more comprehensive and effective 
strategy. Deploying several human rights may strengthen the human rights case by, for 
example, securing protection from a wider range of national and international laws and also 
by generating support from a broader coalition of groups and interests. Also, some duty-
bearers still harbor ideological or other objections to the right to health, and they may be 
quicker to accept the relevance of civil and political rights, such as the right to life. Indeed, it 
might be possible to ‘smuggle’ the right to health into a human rights-based approach without 
triggering ideological objections, although this article does not favor such a tactic. It is 
accepted that there will sometimes be advantages in adopting a human rights-based approach, 
rather than relying only upon the right to health. 
 
The problem identified and addressed in this article is that human rights-based approaches to 
health, however they are defined, run the risk of playing down, and sometimes obscuring, the 
central role of the international right to health. For example, when serving as UN Special 
Rapporteur on the right to health and, more recently, when sitting on a statutory human rights 
inquiry into Northern Ireland’s emergency healthcare, it was sometimes suggested by those in 
authority that they were implicitly including the right to health in policymaking or a human 
rights-based approach to health. This is problematic because, in such a situation, only they 
know whether or not the right to health is present and, if it is, how they interpret and apply it. 
Such arbitrariness is inconsistent with the raison d’être of human rights. One never hears an 
argument for a human rights-based approach to fair trials. But a human rights-based approach 
to fair trials which only implicitly includes the right to a fair trial is inconceivable. If there 
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were a human rights-based approach to fair trials, the explicit right to a fair trial would have 
to be at its center. Of course the parallel is not exact, nonetheless, a human rights-based 
approach to health that only implicitly includes the right to health lacks credibility and 
legitimacy. After all, the right to health is in the Constitution of the World Health 
Organization, all states have ratified one or more treaties which include the right, and it has 
been recognized by the United Nations on innumerable occasions.8 
 
Playing down the right to health may not matter if other human rights within a human rights-
based approach possess all the features enjoyed by the right to health, but they do not. The 
right to health has distinctive characteristics which are indispensable for the effective 
implementation of a human rights-based approach to health. Adopting a human rights-based 
approach, and muting the right to health within it, runs the risk of diminishing both the 
approach and the right to health. Also, it may perpetuate what Yamin and Cantor refer to as 
“an erroneous conception of human rights that is limited to a narrow sphere of civil and 
political rights”.9 All of this points to the importance of legal interpretive methodology: if the 
right to health has distinctive features their interpretation (i.e. establishing the contours and 
content of these distinctive characteristics) becomes crucially important. 
 
In this article, I trace the shifting place of the international right to health, and human rights-
based approaches to health, in the scholarly literature and United Nations. Second, I explore 
some evidence that the international right to health is played down within a human rights-
based approach to health. Third, I analyse the degree to which the international right to health 
has qualities not possessed by other rights forming part of a human rights-based approach to 
health. Because of the importance of these distinctive qualities, I then explore legal 
methodology for the interpretation of the international right to health. After critiquing the 
methodology that Tobin uses to interpret the international right to health, I suggest that the 
“special character” of human rights treaties permits distinctive methods of treaty 
interpretation, while remaining within the interpretative boundaries established by the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. I argue that the international right to health, as part of the 
human rights-based approach to health, should be interpreted by way of these distinctive 
methods of treaty interpretation. In conclusion, I favour a human rights-based approach to 
health which explicitly and consistently includes the international right to health.10 
Trends in the scholarly literature11 
Although the international right to health found its place within the United Nations in 1946, it 
was not subject to academic treatment for more than thirty years. WHO’s first Director-
General, Brock Chisholm, was an energetic proponent of the right to health and it was partly 
thanks to his leadership that the right was firmly established in the International Bill of 
Rights.12 But it was only in 1978, thirty years after Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and twelve years after International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) were adopted by the General Assembly, that some eminent scholars, policy 
makers and others explored the right to health in a three-day workshop organized by the 
Hague Academy of International Law and United Nations University. The proceedings were 
published in 1979 as The right to health as a human right.13 
 
In 1985, the University of Sherbrooke, Quebec, hosted a similar event which was followed by 
papers on the right to health in the Revue Quebecoise de Droit International.14 Four years 
later, the Pan American Health Organization published a voluminous study, The Right to 
Health in the Americas.15 Although mainly a comparative examination of constitutions from 
the region, the study has content on international law and was partly a response to the 
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Declaration of Alma-Ata on Primary Care (1978) which affirms health as “a fundamental 
human right”.16 
 
During 1992–1993, the American Association for the Advancement of Science held four one-
day consultations on “the right to health care”, with a focus on USA, which contributed to 
Chapman’s Exploring a human rights approach to health care reform (1993) and an edited 
collection of papers on the same theme (1994).17 One of the striking features of these 
publications is that they give considerable attention to both the international right to health, or 
health care, and also a human rights approach. Given resistance in the USA to the right to 
health, it was considered strategic to place this right within a human rights approach.  
 
In 1993, there were two other significant meetings on the right to health. In September, the 
Human Rights Program (Harvard Law School) and François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for 
Health and Human Rights (Harvard School of Public Health) brought together a small group 
of people, mainly academics, for a one-day discussion on economic, social and cultural 
rights, with a particular focus on the right to health. Formal papers were not presented but a 
record of the discussions was published in 1995.18 Second, in December, 1993, the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) held a public ‘Day of General 
Discussion on the right to health’ which focused on the meaning to be attributed to Article 12 
ICESCR. When presenting a working paper to his colleagues, Committee member Alvarez 
Vita remarked that “although there was an abundant bibliography on health, very little of it 
related to health as a human right”.19 
 
The groundbreaking “Health and Human Rights: An International Journal” was launched by 
the François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights in 1994.20 The first 
issue’s main article, “Health and human rights”, one of the most seminal in the field, only 
mentions the right to health twice. Once in relation to the preamble of WHO Constitution and 
also when it refers to “the specific health-related responsibilities of states listed in Article 12 
of the ICESCR”, a choice of words that avoids “right to health responsibilities”.21 However, 
the issue’s second article is an important piece on the international right to health in which 
Leary underscores “there have been few serious efforts by international organizations or 
scholars to consider the scope of the right to health”.22 
 
In summary, the emphasis of the relevant literature changes around 1993-94. Beforehand, the 
relatively spare literature focuses on the right to health; from 1993-94, it begins to lean 
toward human rights and health. This shift in emphasis is reinforced in the context of 
HIV/AIDS, for example, the International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, 
adopted in 1996, refer to a “human rights approach” and “rights-based response” and, in the 
following year, Gostin and Lazzarini published Human Rights and Public Health in the AIDS 
Pandemic, which focuses on a human rights approach.23 
 
A brief word is needed about the contribution of WHO. In 1993, WHO published Cook’s 
Human Rights in Relation to Women’s Health which raised issues that not only contributed to 
the World Conference on Human Rights (1993), for which it was written, but also the 
International Conference on Population and Development (1994) and Fourth World 
Conference on Women (1995).24 Four years later, WHO held a two-day informal consultation 
on health and human rights which the chairperson described as “the first meeting at WHO to 
be convened specifically to address health and human rights”.25 In one of the meeting’s key 
papers, Häusermann presented a conceptual framework for the right to health.26 
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Published in 1999, Toebes wrote the first single-author book on the international right to 
health.27 Here, for the first time, was a detailed, coherent, critical examination of the 
international right to health looking at its historical origins, legal content, international 
supervision and justiciability, and appending a draft General Comment on Article 12 
ICESCR. This pioneering book was published about fifty years after the right to health was 
first discussed in the United Nations. Toebes’ analysis has limits, for example, it provides 
neither a philosophical justification for the right to health, nor a clear interpretative 
methodology.28 Nonetheless, it is an exceptional contribution to the literature and, in the 
following year, after extensive consultations, research and discussions, CESCR adopted 
General Comment 14 on the right to health. The Committee did not adopt Toebes’ draft 
General Comment, but her scholarship and draft emboldened the Committee, informed its 
thinking and contributed to its work. 
 
There was another shift in the literature around 1999-2000. Before 1999-2000, the quantity of 
literature on either the right to health or human rights and health was not extensive. But, in 
the seventeen years since the turn of the century, there has been a steady stream of academic 
books, articles, reports and other publications on human rights and health, including the right 
to health. The contrast between the two periods – before and after 1999–2000 – is dramatic.  
 
The post–2000 scholarly monographs on human rights and health, including the right to 
health, display a number of features. First, a minority of them focus on the right to health.29 
Second, most of the monographs base themselves on phrases like ‘human rights 
framework(s)’, ‘rights-based approaches’, ‘health rights’, and ‘human rights’.30 Third, there 
are small clusters of monographs (on the right to health or one of the other formulations) 
around some topics, for example, medicines, sexual and reproductive health, and poverty, 
including neglected diseases. Other topics include health care, litigation, mental health, 
international assistance and cooperation, women’s and children’s health, public health, global 
health, Europe and neoliberalism. Fourth, there are several collections with many 
contributions on a wide range of issues, beginning with Health and Human Rights: A Reader, 
edited by Mann, Gruskin and colleagues; also notable is Health and Human Rights, Basic 
International Documents which runs to over 550 pages.31 
 
In a different group are books of philosophy that examine the foundations of health and 
human rights, such as Ruger’s Health and Social Justice (2010) and Venkatapuram’s Health 
Justice (2011).32 In 2015, Rumbold, in his survey of conceptions of the “moral right to 
health”, observes that “since 2012 alone there has been a cluster of work on the right to 
health” and finds there is “increasing recognition of both the philosophical questions 
engendered by the idea of a human right to health and the potential of philosophical analysis 
to help in the formulation of better policy.”33  
 
In conclusion, prior to 1993-94, a few conferences and publications examined the right to 
health, rather than a human rights-based approach (or similar formulation). They gave the 
international right to health a degree of respectability and began the long process of placing it 
on academic and policy agendas.34 From 1993–1994, the focus began to shift from the right 
to health towards a human rights-based approach. After 1999–2000, there was a dramatic 
increase in the amount of scholarship on both human rights-based approaches to health and 
also the right to health. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine in detail why this sea-change occurred around 
1999–2000. However, drawing from Flood and Gross, the reasons include: the reduction of 
6 
 
the ideological divide between civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural 
rights, after the Cold War; the recognition by many in the human rights movement that their 
relevance and credibility required them to take social rights more seriously; those working on 
HIV/AIDS, and women’s health, grasped the potential of human rights to fortify their 
campaigns e.g. the demand for universal access to antiretroviral therapies was grounded in 
the idea of health as a human right; especially in Latin America and South Africa, 
transformative constitutionalism included new constitutions, often encompassing an 
explicitly justiciable right to health which has generated a huge amount of case law in some 
countries; and human rights were seen as a way of challenging the detrimental impact of neo-
liberal economic policies on health-related services.35 These inter-related factors also 
contributed to developments within the United Nations, to which we now turn. 
 
Key developments in the United Nations 
In addition to the growing scholarly literature since 1999–2000, there have been significant 
health and human rights developments in the United Nations. There is considerable cross-
over between the literature and UN developments. For present purposes, the post 1999–2000 
UN developments may be divided into two. Those that focus on (a) the right to health and (b) 
wider formulations, such as human rights-based approaches to health, which include the right 
to health. 
 
Right to health 
The key right-to-health developments include the adoption of General Comments by human 
rights treaty-bodies, such as General Recommendation 24 of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1999), General Comments 14 (2000) and 22 
(2016) of CESCR, and General Comment 15 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(2015), all of which focus on either the right to health or parts of the right to health, such as 
sexual and reproductive health rights (CESCR’s General Comment 22).36 
 
The developments also include the reports of UN Special Rapporteurs on the right to health:  
the present author (2002–2008), Anand Grover (2008–2014) and Dainius Puras (2014–to 
date). In brief, they have written thematic and mission reports, as well as reports on the 
‘communications’ or complaints they have taken up in the previous year with summaries of 
any replies received. The appendix to the present article lists all the Rapporteurs’ thematic 
and mission reports to date. Also, it signals the themes reported on, such as neglected 
diseases, maternal mortality, medicines, mental health, non-communicable diseases and 
adolescent health, as well as the issues considered in each mission report. To date, the 
Rapporteurs have written 32 thematic reports and 23 mission reports on the right to health. 
 
Although this article does not aim to provide an overview or analysis of these reports, a few 
brief points are in order.37 First, broadly speaking, the reports endeavor to interpret and apply 
the international right to health, drawing from General Comments, international and national 
case law, and academic and other literature. Second, where there are gaps in the 
jurisprudence, the reports suggest the way forward. For example, in 2007 the Human Rights 
Council asked the Rapporteur to prepare a report on health systems and the right to health. At 
that time, there was scarce guidance from the treaty-bodies or elsewhere on this topic and so 
the Rapporteur turned to basic principles, analogous practice, and extensive consultations and 
began to fill this jurisprudential gap.38 Third, the Rapporteurs consult, discuss and research 
widely before writing their reports. Fourth, their more than 50 thematic and mission reports 
provide a unique cache of insights into the interpretation and application of the international 
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right to health. Lastly, although, as befits their UN mandate, Rapporteurs focus on the 
international right to health, sometimes they refer to human rights-based approaches.39 
 
Human rights-based approaches 
As discussed, one of the purposes of General Comments is to provide a bridge between short, 
legalistic treaty provisions and practice. However, it is a long way from one side of the river 
to the other. While General Comments get some of the way, they cannot span the gap alone. 
The Rapporteurs’ thematic and mission reports may provide another arch to the bridge but 
they, too, are unlikely to be sufficiently detailed, specific and practical to reach the other side. 
Often drawing from A human rights-based approach to health, adopted by WHO and 
OHCHR, some UN agencies have risen to the challenge by preparing further guidance on 
how to operationalize human rights in relation to range of health issues.40 The guidance 
varies in several ways, such as provenance, specificity and practicality. However, how high is 
the profile of the international right to health in this guidance? By way of illustration, three 
different forms of guidance are briefly considered. First, however, it is necessary to confirm 
some of the key features of the international right to health. 
 
In 2009, Gruskin, Bogecho and Ferguson conducted a review of scholarly and other literature 
to identify the common elements of a rights-based approach, especially in the context of 
health.41 After analyzing their survey, Gruskin and colleagues propose a framework for 
assessing “institutional articulations” of rights-based approaches to health.42 Their framework 
includes a “minimal list” of “specific norms and standards” to “facilitate operation” of a 
rights-based approach: participation, non-discrimination, availability, accessibility, 
acceptability and quality (known as ‘AAAQ’), transparency and accountability. Participation, 
non-discrimination, transparency and accountability are commonly associated with a range of 
human rights i.e. they are crucial elements of, but not distinctive to, the right to health. On the 
other hand, AAAQ derive from CESCR’s General Comment 14 i.e. they are closely 
associated with the right to health. 
 
As Gruskin and colleagues observe, their list is “minimal”. If the list is to capture the 
influence of the right to health, at least three more elements are needed: progressive 
realization, maximum available resources, and international assistance and cooperation.43 
Thus, when examining the following guidance, particular attention will be paid to: AAAQ, 
progressive realization, maximum available resources, and international assistance and 
cooperation.44 
 
First, under the rubric of ‘Guidelines for Social Mobilization’, A Human Rights Approach to 
Tuberculosis was published by WHO in 2001, not long after CESCR’s adoption of General 
Comment 14 in mid-2000.45 The heart of the Guidelines consists of a section headed ‘What 
are human rights?’ and another called ‘TB and human rights’. The former refers generally to 
the right to health, progressive realization and maximum available resources, and makes an 
oblique reference to international assistance and cooperation. The latter has several sub-
sections on TB and poverty, children, women and similar groups and issues. At the end of 
most of these sub-sections there are a couple of lines on the relevance of human rights to the 
issues under discussion, for example, the only human rights content in the sub-section on 
poverty is a quote from Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.46 Scattered 
throughout the Guidelines there are occasional references to the right to health and General 
Comment 14, including two of the elements of AAAQ i.e. availability and accessibility. 
Importantly, the Guidelines are not intended to be comprehensive and they are one of the 
earliest attempts within the United Nations to apply human rights to a health condition.47 
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Nonetheless, from today’s vantage point they appear weak. The right to health, and some of 
its key elements, are evident, but marginal. 
 
Second, Ensuring human rights in the provision of contraceptive information and services, 
Guidance and recommendations was published by WHO in 2014.48 Twenty-four specific and 
practical recommendations, clustered under concepts such as privacy, participation, 
accountability and AAAQ, arose from an impressive combination of health-related evidence, 
human rights norms and good process. The Guidance is a measure of how far health and 
human rights have travelled since the TB Guidelines thirteen years earlier. As for the place of 
the right to health, AAAQ form a key part of the structure of the Guidance, but international 
assistance and cooperation is only mentioned once, while progressive realisation and 
maximum available resources are barely visible.49 The Guidance considered “human rights 
standards as they are directly or indirectly applicable to contraceptive information and 
services” and its Annex D provides a list of fourteen relevant human rights, including the 
right to health. The Guidance mentions the right to health on a few occasions.50 However, 
despite the prominence given to AAAQ, overall the right to health has a fairly low profile in 
the Guidance. 
 
Third, in 2011 the Human Rights Council asked OHCHR to prepare Technical guidance on 
the application of a human rights-based approach to the implementation of policies and 
programmes to reduce preventable maternal mortality and morbidity.51 The Guidance was 
presented to, and adopted by, the Council in 2012.52 Perhaps because of its origins, the 
Guidance has a different tenor to the other two illustrations. Predictably, its human rights 
content is much stronger than in the TB Guidelines and its evidence-base is weaker than the 
Guidance on contraception. Overall, the maternal mortality Guidance gives significantly 
higher visibility to the right to health through a combination of references to the right, 
AAAQ, progressive realization, maximum available resources, and international assistance 
and cooperation. For example, it devotes a chapter to international assistance and 
cooperation.53 
 
In conclusion, it is unrealistic to expect health policy makers or practitioners to read either a 
treaty provision or its corresponding General Comment and then grasp how they are to 
operationalize the right to health. More detailed, specific and practical human rights guidance 
is essential. By way of illustration, this section has looked at three examples, in two of which 
the right to health has a marginal or low profile and in the third the profile is significantly 
higher. Firm conclusions cannot be drawn from this small sample, but it does highlight some 
important questions, for example, does it matter whether the right to health is absent, 
marginal or prominent? To answer that question it is necessary to clarify the distinctive 
contribution of the right to health to a human rights-based approach. 
 
The distinctive contribution of the right to health 
Drawing from Gruskin and colleagues, the previous section provided a checklist of key right-
to-health features, such as progressive realization, maximum available resources and so on. 
However, more substantively, what is the distinctive contribution of the right to health to a 
human rights-based approach? What does it contribute that other rights, which usually form 
part of such an approach, do not? 
 
Many health policies, programs and interventions cannot be implemented overnight, they 
take time, often years. Also, they usually require extensive resources. In the case of low- and 
middle-income countries, the resources include development assistance. For these reasons, 
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the international right to health encompasses progressive realization, maximum available 
resources and international assistance and cooperation.54 These concepts do not enfeeble the 
right to health. On the contrary, they ensure the right to health has the conceptual and 
operational potential to make a sustained contribution to the implementation of complex and 
costly health interventions that inevitably take years to put in place, and will usually be on-
going. Also, as discussed, General Comments have increased the usefulness of the right to 
health by interpreting it as including AAAQ.55 
 
Most of the other international human rights that are part of a human rights-based approach to 
health, such as the rights to life, privacy and the prohibition against torture and inhuman and 
degrading treatment, do not have progressive realization and these other features. Of course, 
these other rights have a vital role to play in human rights-based approaches. But, for the 
most part, they do not have the qualities that give the right to health an indispensable role in 
relation to many health interventions, such as the construction of a quality health system for 
all, putting in place a program for contraceptive information and services, or establishing 
harm reduction strategies for intravenous drug users. With few exceptions, civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights place both negative and positive obligations on duty-
bearers. However, the law and practice of economic, social and cultural rights provide a more 
refined and extensive treatment of positive rights (i.e. the duty to fulfill and aspects of the 
duty to protect) than is provided by civil and political rights. In short, the right to health is 
equipped to make a crucial and distinctive contribution to a human rights-based approach to 
health. 
 
The argument here is that the right to health has the conceptual and operational potential to 
make an indispensable and distinctive contribution, especially in relation to the 
implementation of complex, costly and long-term health interventions. It is accepted, 
however, that this potential is not yet fully realized. Building on recent progress, more work 
is needed to develop concepts and practices that will make the right to health more effective 
and useful to policy makers, practitioners and others. For example, in the context of finite 
budgets, how can policy makers prioritize among health interventions in a manner that is 
respectful of the international right to health? In recent years, progress has been made 
towards answering this question, but the issues are complex and invite additional 
consideration.56 Further advancing the conceptual and operational development of the 
international right to health will require multidisciplinary collaboration. 
 
In conclusion, according to Gruskin, Mills and Tarantola, “the right to health forms the basis 
for much of the present work in health and human rights”.57 O’Connell agrees: “a consensus 
has emerged on the centrality of health as a basic human right”.58 While Murphy tends to the 
same view, “the rights to health and to have access to health care can be at the centre”, she 
adds an important rider with which I concur, “but other rights need to be present too”.59  
 
The conceptual and operational contours and content of the right to health are becoming 
clearer and there is a strong case that the right to health makes a contribution to human rights-
based approaches by way of its distinctive features, such as AAAQ, progressive realization, 
maximum available resources, and international assistance and cooperation. However, this 
valuable contribution is unlikely to be realized unless the right to health, including its 
distinctive features, are explicitly recognized and consistently applied. As we have seen, there 
is some preliminary evidence that this is not happening in relation to some human rights-
based approaches to health. This is partly a failure of legal interpretation. 
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If the right to health provisions of a treaty are relevant then, according to article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, they have to be “interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its objects and purpose.”60 In other words, the distinctive features of the 
right to health cannot be ignored or applied on some occasions but not on others; they have to 
be interpreted and applied in “good faith”, in accordance with their “ordinary meaning” and 
“context”, and in light of the treaty’s “objects and purpose”. This does not mean that the 
drafters of human rights-based approaches to health have to become international lawyers. 
But it does mean they are required to have regard to the interpretation (i.e. the meaning) of 
the international right to health, and its distinctive features. So we now turn to the issue of 
legal interpretation. 
 
Legal interpretative methods 
In 2009, Coomans and colleagues complained that “scholarship in the field of human rights is 
often lacking in attention to methodology”.61 In recent years, attention to human rights 
method has grown, including in relation to health. For example, a new interest in measuring 
the evidence of impact of human rights on the health and well-being of individuals and 
communities has led to consideration of multidisciplinary research and evaluation methods.62 
The increasing attention to human rights method may arise from two inter-related factors: a 
deepening interest in the practical operationalization of human rights and the growing 
multidisciplinarity of human rights studies. Both factors are especially acute in relation to 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
The growing interest in human rights method extends to human rights legal method. Murphy 
regrets that human rights legal method has been “a non-topic … more disregarded than 
studied”.63 In Health and Human Rights she argues that “engagement with human rights legal 
method is essential” and she puts it “at centre stage”.64 
 
In The Right to Health in International Law, after helpful chapters on the history of the right 
to health and its conceptual foundations, Tobin devotes a chapter to a legal methodology for 
the interpretation of the international right to health.65 His methodology illustrates major 
issues concerning the legal interpretation of the international right to health, as well as 
economic, social and cultural rights more generally. It highlights issues that arise when 
treaty-bodies, Special Rapporteurs and agencies endeavor to interpret and apply the 
international right to health. Thus, Tobin’s proposed interpretative methodology warrants 
examination. 
 
In summary, Tobin argues that the act of interpretation “is an attempt to persuade the relevant 
interpretative community that a particular interpretation of the right to health is the most 
appropriate meaning to adopt”.66 The “interpretative community” is not confined to states, it 
includes “a much wider range of stakeholders” and their “interests and insights must be taken 
into account in the interpretative exercise – a process described as constructive 
engagement”.67 By “interpretative community”, Tobin explains that he means states, health 
professionals, international organizations, NGOs, religious groups, multinational corporations 
and “members of the general community who may be affected by the reallocation of 
resources to realize the right to health”.68 General community members appear to be included 
to ensure, for example, the health budget is not privileged over the education or housing 
budgets. At the beginning of his discussion Tobin says that states form “a core part” of his 
interpretative community and later he describes them as “the central actors”.69 He explains 
that, to be persuasive, the interpretation must satisfy four criteria – “it must be principled, 
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practical, coherent, and context sensitive” – each of which he discusses in some detail.70 
Tobin favors an approach that “accepts the need to entertain a certain level of deference to the 
varied and often potentially conflicting interests within the relevant interpretative 
community”.71 
 
Lougarre is troubled by Tobin’s interpretative methodology for three reasons. First, she 
doubts whether “consensus” among his interpretative community “should be the way we 
define human rights law”72 and observes there are “dangers that appeals to consensus might 
create”.73 Young also argues that “the consensualist approach to the interpretation of 
economic and social rights is beset with several limitations”.74 The approach fails “because it 
makes legitimate only the lowest common denominator of international protection”.75 If 
Tobin were to object that he is not arguing in favor of consensus,76 Young also points out that 
replacing unanimity with what she calls “majority consensus” is also problematic “because of 
the inevitable tendency to prejudice the minority articulation of rights”.77 She reminds us that 
“the claims of minorities … are a main reason for the existence of rights”78 and concludes 
“that focusing on consensus alone thwarts the definition of economic and social rights”.79 
 
Lougarre’s second difficulty with Tobin’s interpretative methodology is that it does not 
provide a solution to resolve conflicting views within the interpretative community.80 Third, 
she doubts that his interpretative methodology “offers legal certainty to rights-holders and 
duty-bearers”.81 
 
In my view, there are several difficulties with Tobin’s interpretative methodology. For 
example, he begins by saying his aim is to devise a methodology that produces a meaning, or 
interpretation, of the right to health, but later he says the “aim … is to contribute to a dialogue 
with the interpretative community whereby an understanding as to the practical 
implementation of the right to health will be developed through consultation and 
negotiation”.82 Of course, interpretation and implementation are (or should be) closely 
related. Nonetheless, they remain distinct exercises. Interpretation focuses on clarifying the 
contours and content of the right to health i.e. what the right means. On the other hand, 
implementation may be understood as diverse practical measures – laws, policies, practices, 
interventions and so on – designed to ensure its realization.83 Put simply, one needs a method 
to interpret the right to health (e.g. Article 12 ICESCR) and also a process to work out how to 
implement it in the context of a particular State Party (e.g. taking into account Article 2.1 of 
the ICESCR). Implementation measures are bound to vary from one state to another, not least 
because all countries (a) are at different stages of progressive realization and (b) have 
different resource capacity. Although the overarching meaning of the right to health is not 
static, it will be much more constant, across both countries and time, than its implementation 
measures. In short, Tobin’s interpretative methodology would be more coherent and credible 
if it more clearly distinguished between interpretation and implementation. 
 
However, his methodology has a more serious defect. At no point does Tobin mention the 
rights-holders for whom Article 12 is of particular importance: those living in poverty. Of 
course, Article 12 has universal application, it extends to everyone in a state’s jurisdiction. 
But, like ICESCR in general, Article 12 has special relevance to the impoverished. The 
better-off, through their superior financial and other resources, including what Bourdieu calls 
“social capital”, are in a much stronger position to enjoy the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health than those living in poverty.84 Accordingly, any interpretative 
methodology of Article 12 that fails to even acknowledge those living in poverty is deeply 
flawed for two reasons. One, it will have failed to put in place effective arrangements within 
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the interpretative (or implementation) process that permit the active and informed 
participation of those living in poverty.85 Two, it is unlikely to identify and address the 
substantive health issues that are priorities for the impoverished. In short, Tobin’s 
“interpretative community”, which includes states, multinational corporations and religious 
groups, excludes the individuals and communities who should be at the procedural and 
substantive center of the interpretative exercise. Tobin includes “NGOs that invoke the 
language of the right to health” in his “interpretative community”, but this could mean 
organizations that are far removed from the realities or insights of those living in poverty. 
 
Of course it is challenging to ensure the active and informed participation of those living in 
poverty in either an interpretative or implementation process. Certainly, elites and their allies 
will cavil and resist. Nonetheless, there is a wealth of theory and practice from which to 
draw.86 In Localising Human Rights, for example, de Feyter outlines four links in a chain: 
community-based organizations, local human rights NGOs, international NGOs, and allies in 
governmental and intergovernmental institutions.87 The essential starting point is to ensure 
the impoverished are visible and, by one means or another, have space to speak. Regrettably, 
Tobin’s methodology provides for neither and this casts a long shadow over the rest of his 
analysis. 
 
Distinctive methods for the interpretation of ICESCR 
Tobin’s methodology points to juridical issues concerning the legal interpretation of 
international economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to health in the context 
of human rights-based approaches. 
 
International policy makers, and international human rights bodies, have only recently begun 
to routinely apply, and interpret, economic, social and cultural rights. There are exceptions, 
such as the ILO and its adjudicative bodies. Also, CESCR has been interpreting and applying 
economic, social and cultural rights since the late 1980s. Now that the Optional Protocol to 
the ICESCR has entered into force, the Committee will have new opportunities to deepen its 
jurisprudence. Numerous UN Special Rapporteurs have interpreted and applied a range of 
economic, social and cultural rights in relation to many themes and duty-bearers. Guidelines 
on international economic, social and cultural rights are increasing.88 Nonetheless, on the 
whole, the international interpretation and application of these human rights is a relatively 
recent enterprise. As international economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to 
health, gain currency, methodologies for their interpretation will have to address the 
relationship between public international law and international human rights law. 
 
International human rights law is almost universally understood as a distinct sub-discipline of 
the broader, more general, public international law.89 However, the relationship between the 
two domains “is a complex narrative of tension, evolution and juxtaposition.”90 While public 
international law is “traditionally considered as the rules and processes created by sovereign 
states to govern their interactions with each other”, international human rights law is 
essentially concerned with placing entitlements on individuals and correlative obligations on 
states, in other words the “constraint of state or public power.”91 As Sheeran puts it, the 
origins of public international law are “inter-state” and the main focus of international human 
rights law is “intra-state”.92 
 
Usually, international treaties reflect a contractual paradigm characterized by reciprocity 
between States i.e. an “exchange of obligations” between States in relation to peace, 
disarmament, trade and other international matters.93 However, international human right 
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treaties do not conform to this paradigm because, as expressed by the UN Human Rights 
Committee, they “are for the benefit of persons within [the state’s] jurisdiction”.94 According 
to Craven, “it does seem that the overriding ‘contractual’ paradigm is largely (if not wholly) 
inappropriate in the case of human rights treaties”.95  
 
As already discussed, article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides 
general rules of interpretation for all treaties, including human rights treaties.96 Broadly 
speaking, there are three schools of thought – or “doctrinal divisions” – for treaty 
interpretation, the ‘textual’, ‘intentions’ and ‘teleological’ approaches, and Clapham observes 
that Article 31 manages to combine all three. 97 Article 32 provides the “Supplementary 
means of interpretation” e.g. the preparatory work of a treaty or travaux préparatoires. 
 
A further important rule of interpretation is lex specialis derogat legi generali: whenever two 
or more norms deal with the same subject matter, priority should be given to the norm that is 
more specific.98 Sheeran remarks that this maxim is relevant in respect of competing rules 
between public international law and international human rights law, and also within 
international human rights law.99 While the application of the rule of lex specialis needs 
considerable care, it may have relevance in the context of international human rights law and 
international economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
International human rights and other bodies have considered these challenging issues of 
interpretation.100 Here, it is neither possible nor necessary to analyze these contributions. 
However, three judicial pronouncements are especially instructive. The Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights confirmed that human rights treaties do not conform to the traditional 
paradigm of an exchange of obligations between states: “In concluding these human rights 
treaties, the States can be deemed to submit themselves to a legal order within which they, for 
the common good, assume various obligations, not in relation to other States, but towards all 
individuals within their jurisdiction”.101 
 
The European Court of Human Rights provides more specific interpretative guidance: “In 
interpreting the Convention regard must be had to its special character as a treaty for the 
collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms …. Thus, the object and 
purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings 
require that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical 
and effective …. In addition, any interpretation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed must 
be consistent with the ‘general spirit of the Convention, an instrument designed to maintain 
and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society’”.102 
 
In its Advisory Opinion on the Genocide Convention, the International Court of Justice not 
only alludes to the Convention’s distinctive character and the inapplicability of the traditional 
contractual paradigm, it also emphasizes the importance of the “high ideals” underpinning the 
treaty: “Consequently, in a convention of this type one cannot speak of individual advantages 
and disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between 
rights and duties. The high ideals which inspired the Convention provide, by virtue of the 
common will of the parties, the foundation and measure of all its provisions”.103 
 
In summary, there is a credible argument that the distinctive features (or “special character”) 
of human rights treaties permit distinctive methods of interpretation, while remaining within 
the interpretative boundaries established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.104 
If that is correct, what are these distinctive methods? 
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Briefly, Sheeran advises that the “corpus juris of human rights features a dominant dynamic 
or teleological method of interpretation, which considers treaties as ‘living’ instruments, 
rather than tied to the original intent of states parties”.105 This corpus has developed without 
much reference to international economic, social and cultural rights because, as discussed, it 
is only recently that international policy makers, and international human rights bodies, have 
begun to routinely apply, and interpret, international economic, social and cultural rights. 
However, if the prevailing human rights interpretative method tends to favor a teleological 
approach, this tendency is likely to be even more pronounced in relation to international 
economic, social and cultural rights. Article 2.1 ICESCR requires States to take steps “with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant”.106 Thus, with its explicit focus on progression towards a goal, both the text and 
the apparent intentions of the parties point towards a teleological method of interpretation in 
relation to international economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to health. 
 
Apart from their different catalogues of rights, what are the major differences between the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and ICESCR which have 
interpretative implications? Here, I confine myself to two differences. First, as is well-known, 
the key textual provisions in ICCPR and ICESCR establishing the overarching legal 
obligations of States Parties are substantively different. For example, while Article 2.1 
ICCPR uses the language of “respect and ensure”, Article 2.1 ICESCR, as already discussed, 
requires States Parties “to take steps, individually and through international assistance and 
cooperation … to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization” of the enumerated rights.107 
 
Second, while the object and purpose of ICCPR and ICESCR have much in common, there is 
an argument that their objects and purposes are also different; if that is correct, Article 31 
VCLT requires those interpreting the treaties to give due weight to this difference. Looking at 
ICESCR as a whole, it can be argued that the object and purpose animating the Covenant is 
the reduction and elimination of poverty, what President Roosevelt called “freedom from 
want”.108 Although closer examination of the object and purpose of the Covenant is needed, 
the tenor of CESCR’s statement on poverty tends to support this argument.109 Of course, it is 
critically important that those living in poverty enjoy the full range of civil and political 
rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Nonetheless, arguably ICESCR is 
shaped by the object and purpose of reducing and eliminating poverty, while ICCPR is not. If 
so, VCLT calls for ICESCR to be interpreted in a different manner from ICCPR, quite apart 
from their obvious textual differences.110 
 
In summary, there is considerable support for the proposition that the distinctive features of 
human rights treaties permit distinct methods of interpretation. In addition, if its object and 
purpose is to reduce and eliminate poverty, ICESCR may be interpreted differently from 
ICCPR, quite apart from the textual differences between the two treaties. As ICESCR is 
increasingly applied, international policy makers and human rights bodies will need to give 
close attention to the distinctive legal interpretation of this Covenant, including the right to 
health in the context of human rights-based approaches to health. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that, in relation to human rights and health, the current trend is from 
theory to practice and the general to specific. Hence the recent practical guidelines on 
specific health issues, such as contraception, maternal mortality and under-five mortality. It 
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has also shown that, since about 1993–1994 there has been a trend in the scholarly literature 
away from consideration of the right to health by itself and towards looking at health and 
human rights generally i.e. human rights-based approaches to health. On the whole, these 
trends are welcome, for example, there are some advantages in moving from a right to health 
towards a human rights-based approach. However, this article has also argued, and 
demonstrated by way of preliminary evidence, that there are risks associated with the 
adoption of a human rights-based approach to health. 
 
In the context of health policies, programs and interventions, the human right of most central 
relevance will usually be the international right to health. The right has some features which 
make it especially well-equipped to contribute to the effective implementation of health 
policies and interventions, over the medium- and long-term, in countries with different 
resource capacities. A risk arising from a human rights-based approach is that the right to 
health may be played down and become marginal within such an approach. Moreover, there 
is some preliminary evidence that this is happening. This might occur because the 
international right to health is not well-understood. Also, in some quarters, there is 
ideological resistance to the right to health in which case it may be convenient to ‘bury’ the 
right within a human rights-based approach. For whatever reason, if the right to health does 
not explicitly play a central role in a human rights-based approach, this is likely to weaken 
such an approach, diminish the right and reinforce misconceptions about, and the 
marginalization of, economic, social and cultural rights generally. 
 
Thus, the preferred strategy is a human rights-based approach to health that consistently and 
explicitly includes the international right to health. Certainly, giving the international right to 
health an explicit and central role within a human rights-based approach will complicate 
some discussions. For example, it will become necessary to (a) distinguish between those 
human rights that are, and are not, subject to progressive realization; (b) explain that the right 
to health places more demanding obligations on high-income than low-income countries, 
except there are some “core obligations” that apply uniformly to all countries e.g. non-
discrimination, equitable access and the adoption of an effective, participatory health strategy 
that gives particular attention to the disadvantaged; (c) confirm that states and others “in a 
position to assist” have a responsibility to provide international assistance and cooperation in 
health, especially to low-income countries; (d) explain that duty-bearers are accountable for 
their right to health obligations, including optimal progressivity, just as they are their 
obligations under the right to a fair trial; and (e) discuss that, while effective health 
monitoring is very important, it is not the same as accountability, but one step towards 
accountability.111 
 
In this way, however, myths may be dispelled and rights-holders and duty-bearers may better 
grasp that the international right to health is not just exhortatory or rhetorical, on the contrary, 
it can help to improve the health and well-being of individuals, communities and 
populations.112 But this is unlikely to happen if the international right to health is placed on 
the fringes of a human rights-based approach, only implicitly present or ‘smuggled’ in 
without discussion.113 
 
This is why legal interpretation is important. If the international right to health is to be 
applied, it needs to be explicitly placed in the center of a human rights-based approach and 
interpreted in accordance with public international, and international human rights, law. The 
meaning of Article 2.1 ICESCR, such as progressive realization, resource availability, and 
international assistance and cooperation, as well as AAAQ, need careful discussion, 
16 
 
interpretation and application. These phrases and concepts are not yellow post-its: they have 
substantive content. Also, consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
attention has to be given to the object and purpose of ICESCR, which probably include the 
reduction and elimination of poverty. Of course, the interpretative exercise will be 
challenging because neither the meaning of the right to health, nor the methods for its 
interpretation, are settled.114 However, it is only by explicitly putting the right to health at the 
center of human rights-based approaches to health, and by discussing its interpretation and 
application, including discussions with those living in poverty, that the right can mature and 
consolidate its place in the international code of human rights. 
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